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INTRODUCTION
Under the name of Modelling Management
Strategies, a series of techniques based on stochastic
simulation and computational statistics have recent-
ly been developed. The purpose of these tools is to
facilitate analysis of the consequences and risks of
different management measures applied to particular
stocks. These techniques have been developed main-
ly with application to the North Atlantic in the
framework of ICES (International Council for the
Exploration of the Sea) and in the Southern Atlantic
by Butterworth and Bergh (1993), Punt (1992, 1993)
and Horwood (1994). These models consist of using
a stock simulator (operating model) and a simulator
of the assessment process, both provided with dif-
ferent error sources. Using this procedure, the whole
process of stock dynamics, fishing activity, fishery
assessment and fishery management as an adaptive
process can be simulated. 
The direct application of such techniques to the
Mediterranean is problematic for two reasons: 
- The management of Mediterranean fisheries is
carried out by means of rules such as effort limita-
tion and other technical measures that are not peri-
odically reviewed, while no TACs (with the notable
exception of large pelagics) or any other measure
implying regular assessment and adaptive manage-
ment are implemented.
- The fishing activity is mainly driven by eco-
nomic considerations. This is also the case in the
Atlantic; however, the management by TACs limits
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the role of fishermen’s decisions, at least regarding
their use of the stock. The system of limiting effort
in the Mediterranean allows the fishermen to devel-
op different strategies to increase fishing mortality
(Franquesa (Coord.), 1998), and therefore fisher-
men’s decisions are included in the model. 
The objectives of fisheries managers are diverse
and often contradictory. They could be to maximize
fishing production or revenues, to minimize catch
fluctuations, to avoid the risk of collapse of the
resource, to maintain employment, etc. In the case
of effort control, the manager has two kinds of tools
available: technical (limitation of the effort, meshes,
legal sizes), and economic (subsidies, taxes, penal-
ties). An extensive evaluation of the effect of these
economic measures is available in OECD (2000).
The effectiveness of each of these tools in achieving
the manager’s purpose varies. In a complex system,
as fisheries can be, it is not always evident what will
be the response from the system to a certain man-
agement measure. Furthermore, predictions of the
indirect effects of a certain measure are still more
uncertain. 
There is evidence that some important resources
of the Mediterranean are clearly overexploited: e.g.
hake (Aldebert et al. 1993, Aldebert and Recasens,
1996), or are exposed to a non-optimal exploitation:
e.g. anchovy (Pertierra and Lleonart, 1996). Build-
ing the stock to sustainable levels, probably giving
higher yield, implies overcoming a short-term crisis.
The evaluation of the biological and economic con-
sequences of the various alternative transition
processes to bring about recovering a stock should
be an interesting issue for the decision-maker. 
The final users of the product are three: the sci-
entist, the decision-maker, and the fisherman. For
the scientist, the present model constitutes a
research tool that should lead to an improved under-
standing of the mechanisms by which the fisheries
system operates. It can also be an advisory tool, as
the model acts as a test bench for analysing different
management options, decision risks, sensibility of
the parameters, etc. In addition, it identifies the fun-
damental parameters.
For the administrators and decision-makers, the
model offers a way to assess the economic and bio-
logical effects of particular management measures
(technical, economic or both) in the short and mid
term. This could be very useful in the design of poli-
cies for mid-term objectives and for exploring dif-
ferent ways to attain them. It is also important that
the administrators realize the extent to which the
fishery depends on the dynamics of a biological
resource and not only on economic decisions. 
The model offers fishermen and managers a new
perspective on the behaviour of the system, includ-
ing its temporal scale. The model should contribute
to an increased comprehension of the usefulness or
uselessness of certain management measures, and
establish the difference between short and mid term
regarding earnings and losses. 
In order to analyse the applicability of the Mod-
elling Management Strategies to Mediterranean
fisheries, research started in 1994 within the frame-
work of the EU Directorate General XIV funded
project “Quantitative Analysis of the Relationships
which condition the North Occidental Mediter-
ranean Fishing System” (acronym: Heures) (Fran-
quesa (Coord.), 1998; Franquesa, 1996). Later, a
project, M5, funded by the Spanish Agency for the
Science and Technology (CICYT) allowed us to
proceed further in the elaboration of the model. A
software package has been developed complement-
ing the conceptual model. There are two versions:
the analytical model (MEFISTO), and a simplified
version using the global approach (or production
method) for the stock box (MECON) with formative
and pedagogical objectives.
MODEL FUNDAMENTALS
The objective of the model is to reproduce the
fishing conditions characteristic of the Mediter-
ranean, including several aspects that differentiate it
from the models elaborated for the Atlantic fish-
eries. The most important particularities are: 
- The model should necessarily be bioeconomic
to accommodate the dynamic nature of living
resources, and at the same time the economic rela-
tionships that govern Mediterranean fisheries. 
- Management is mainly based on effort control,
although other technical and economic measures
exist. 
- The management system is non-adaptive. No
regular assessments are done and hence no adaptive
management policy is implemented. TACs don’t
exist and the economic administrative tools acquire
as much importance as the technical tools.
- Increasing “catchability” (in effect, efficiency)
is the mechanism of increasing fishing mortality by
the fishermen: they cannot increase fishing effort,
as defined by law in the Mediterranean area, i.e. via
fishing time and installed power. Therefore they
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will always try to maximize fishing mortality. The
only mechanism available to fishermen to increase
catch without increasing nominal effort is to
increase catchability by means of investment in
technology. An essential point of the model is the
exploration of catchability as a function of the
installed capital and time. Smit (1996) recognized
that the potential fishing capacity of a vessel can be
measured as the gross proceeds of the vessel. If the
investment is related to the proceeds, we propose
that the total investment in the vessel (capital) is
related to the fishing capacity (catchability). In
accordance with this hypothesis, a bioeconomic
model, rather than a biological one, is the more
appropriate to simulate the Mediterranean fishery,
since it is in certain measures self-managed by the
fishermen through economic mechanisms.
- It is multispecies, multigear, and multifleet. 
The model has been built in a modular way on a
system of “boxes.” A total of three boxes are
defined: 
- The stock box. This simulates the dynamics of a
particular stock. The input is the fishing effort and
the catchability (output of the fisherman’s box)
whose product constitutes the fishing mortality
applied to the stock. The output is the catch that goes
into the market box. The stock box can have diverse
simultaneous boxes (multispecies). There are
species of two kinds: the main species, whose
dynamics are completely explicit, and the secondary
species, whose dynamics are not known but whose
yields are computed as a function of those of the
main species. 
- The market box. This converts the catch for
each main species and secondary species into money
with specified price functions. One has to consider
the base price, the size of fish, and the amount of the
fish offer on the market. 
- The fishermen box. This simulates the fisher-
man’s economic behaviour. The input is the money
produced in the market box. The output is the effort
(within a maximum limit set by the legislation) and
the catchability, over which the fisherman has cer-
tain control as function of the vessel’s capital. The
parameters of the fishermen box are contained at
different levels: country, fleet, and boat. The level
country contains the most general economic para-
meters that embrace diverse fleets (such as cost of
fuel). The level fleet contains the technical and
economic parameters characteristic of each fleet
(initial vectors of catchability and fishing mortali-
ty, GT, initial capital, etc.). Finally, the last level,
vessel, allows particularisation of the characteris-
tics of each boat (vessel specific costs, capital and
catchability). 
The simulations forward in time are conducted
by carrying a complete cycle in each time unit. The
profits of the last time unit revert in the fishing activ-
ity of the boat in the following time unit. Contrary to
the Atlantic models, we don’t include any assess-
ment box.
The operation of the model also has the follow-
ing characteristics: 
- The unit of time of the simulation process and
that of presentation of results can be specified as
week, month, quarter or year. 
- The analysis can be deterministic or stochastic.
The values of certain parameters can be modified
at different moments of the simulation (“events”) for
the purpose of simulating administrative actions.
The stock box 
The stock box simulates the dynamics of the
resource and uses the standard equations of popula-
tion dynamics. See notation in Table 1. The model is
multispecies and it admits two types of species:
main species, with well-known dynamics, and sec-
ondary species whose dynamics are defined in rela-
tion to those of the main species. The model is struc-
tured by fish age, a, and gear, g. 
The fishing mortality at age a generated by a gear
g is defined as 
Fag = Sag · Eg · qag
where Sag is the selectivity factor accounting for the
interaction gear-fish, Eg is the effort applied by the
gear g, and qag the catchability that corresponds to
the gear g and the age a, (at time t and for capital K,
not explicitly shown for brevity). 
The total fishing mortality corresponding to age
a is:
and the total mortality corresponding to age a is 
Za = Fa + Ma
where Ma is the instantaneous natural mortality rate
at age a. 
The dynamics of the number of individuals of a
cohort responds to the following equation: 
F Fa ag
g
G
= ∑
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Na+1,t+1 = Nat exp (-Zat) 
where Nat is number of individuals of age class a at
the beginning of the time t. Since the age a and the
time t are measured in the same units, an individual
of age a in time t will have age a+1 in time t+1. 
The average number of individuals during the
age-class interval a is: 
The von Bertalanffy growth model is assumed: 
la = L∞ (1 - exp (-k (a-t0)))
and the relative growth in weight is: 
With the mean weights by age, the mean biomass
by age can be calculated: 
Ba a aN w=
w A la a
B
= ⋅
N N
Z
Za a
a
a
=
− −( )1 exp
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TABLE 1. – Notation. M: mass, L: length, T: time, MU: monetary units
symbol units dim
N– mean number of individuals indiv. -
B– mean biomass ton M
w– mean individual weight g M
α parameter of the stock-recruitment relationship:   
B&H model -
Ricker’s model ton-1 M-1 
β parameter of the stock-recruitment relationship ton-1 M-1
τ parameter in the captial-catchability relationship -
µ parameter in the revenue-catch relationship for secondary species 
(additive model) € MU
(multiplicative model) €·ton -ν MU·M-ν
ν parameter in the revenue-catch relationship for secondary species -
γ1 reference price. parameter in the price model €/kg MU·M-1
γ2 size-price modifier. parameter in the price model -
γ3 offer-price modifier. parameter in the price model -
a age year T
A parameter in the length-weight relationship g/cmB M·L-B
B parameter in the length-weight relationship -
B biomass ton M
E effort hours·day T
C catch ton/year M·T-1
C1 Trade cost €/year MU·T-1
C2 Daily cost €/year MU·T-1
C3 Labour cost €/year MU·T-1
C4 Compulsory cost (inevitable to remaining in the activity) €/year MU·T-1
C5 Maintenance cost €/year MU·T-1
C6 Opportunity cost €/year MU·T-1
C7 Financial cost €/year MU·T-1
Ca Part of maintenance cost avoidable €/year MU·T-1
ca % of the maintenance cost that is avoidable
i vessel index
K capital € MU
K0 initial capital € MU
k growth rate in the von Bertalanffy growth model year-1 T-1
l length cm L
L
∞
maximum length in the von Bertalanffy growth model cm L
M natural mortality rate year-1 T-1
m maximum age year T
MM monte menor € MU
N number of individuals indiv.
O offer ton M
p price €/kg MU·M-1
q catchability day-2 T-2
Q0 initial catchability day-2 T-2
R recruitment indiv.
RT total revenue €/year MU·T-1
S selectivity -
SSB spawning stock biomass ton M
t time year T
t0 age at length 0 in the von Bertalanffy growth model year T
w individual weight g M
Y revenue €/year MU·T-1
Z total mortality rate year-1 T-1
The total mean biomass for the whole stock is 
The catches are also calculated by gear: 
The total catch by age, gear and both are, respectively:
, and
.
To carry out the simulations we are required to
model the recruitment (N1). Except for the case of
constant recruitment, the number of recruits is a
function of the spawning stock biomass (SSB) that is
calculated from the proportion of mature fish by age
(Ia) of the mean biomass: 
Three different procedures for generating recruits
are used: 
- constant recruitment, where for each simulation
the same number of recruits N1 (constant) is gener-
ated;
- Beverton and Holt’s model:
- and Ricker’s model 
The function of catchability 
The input to the stock box and the output from
the fishermen box are the fishing effort Eg vector and
the catchability qag matrix. Since the maximum fish-
ing effort is limited by Mediterranean fisheries leg-
islation, the mechanism whereby fishermen increase
F is by increasing catchability. There are a large
number of elements that relate fishing effort with
fishing mortality, and they are all contained within
catchability. Laurec and Le Guen (1981) give the
following outline: 
1) availability: depends on the fish and on the
fishing gear and is independent of the fisherman’s
behaviour.
a) accessibility: geographical component,
displacement from and to the fishing areas. 
b) vulnerability: related to fish behaviour.
2) efficiency: this depends, among other factors,
on the fishing strategy or fishing tactics. 
Of all these elements, the one that the fisherman
clearly can modify is efficiency for one particular
gear (we exclude gear changes in our model). That
depends on, among other things, technological
progress, and this is modelled here as a function of
capital (more investment results in increased fishing
efficiency) and of time (technological progress
improves with time and becomes more affordable).
Our modelling approach is outlined as follows:
We assume the following equation to express qt,K,
the catchability as a function of time t and capital K. 
for K0≠0 and h≠0, where τ and h are parameters, and
Q0 and K0 are the initial catchability and the initial
capital (at t=0) respectively. 
To make qt constant, and equal to Q0, it is neces-
sary that τ = 1 and h →∞. 
To make qt only depend on time it is necessary
that τ ≠1 and h →∞. To make qt increase at an annu-
al p %, τ = 1+p/100. If τ < 1 the catchability decreas-
es with time. 
To make qt only depend on capital it is necessary
that τ = 1 and h > 0, but not h>> 0 (in order for the
effect to be seen, h·K should be smaller than 5 and is
recommended to be of the order of 1). Maximum
catchability (for “infinite” capital) is 
Q0/ (1-exp(-h·K0)). 
Thus, the two parameters have the following
meaning: 
τ (condition: τ>0, reasonable τ ≥1) Expresses the
dependence on time, for example if we assume an
annual catchability growth of 2%, τ =1.02. If τ =1, q
is independent of time. 
h (condition: h>0). This is a modifying influence
of capital in the calculation of catchability. If h is
high, capital doesn’t affect catchability. If h is very
near 0 the weight of capital is substantial (even
excessively so). 
Multispecies 
The model is multispecies, admitting two class-
es or types of species: the main species and the
associate, or secondary, species. In either case only
technical interactions are envisaged by the model,
q Q e
e
t K
t
hK
hK, =
−
−
−
−
0
1
1 0
τ
N SSBe SSB1 =
−α β
N
SSB1
1
=
+α β
SSB SSBa
a
m
= ∑
SSB Ia a a= B
C Cag
g
G
a
m
= ∑∑C Cg ag
a
G
= ∑C Ca ag
g
G
= ∑
C Fag ag a= B
B = Ba
a
m
=
∑
1
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not ecological interactions (such a predation or
competition).
The main species are defined as those whose
dynamics are known so they can be simulated with
the equations expressed previously. The secondary
species are a pool of species that are significant to
the fishery from an economic point of view (as
accompanying species or associated with a main
species), but whose population dynamics are
unknown. We assume an empirical relationship of
the associated species with the main species in one
of the two following ways, the multiplicative model:  
Y = µ ·Cν
or the additive model: 
Y = µ + ν ·C 
where µ and ν are parameters, C is the catch of the
main species, and Y are the revenues yielded by the
secondary species. µ and ν can be derived from
actual catch data. ν denotes the correlation between
the catch of the main species and the economic yield
of the secondary species; hence when ν >0 the rev-
enues obtained from the secondary species grows
with increasing catch of the main species. When ν
<0 then the reversal holds true and when ν =0 then
the secondary species is independent from the main
species to which it is associated. µ is a scale para-
meter, which also holds the conversion of catch to
revenue units.
The market box 
The total revenues of a gear are calculated
according to 
where pa is the unit price of age-a catch. This price
is calculated following the market law (Lleonart et
al., 1996):
where O (the offer on the market) is the sum of catch
C plus any imports of this species. This model is
extremely simple to facilitate its practical use. Mod-
els such as Peredy et al. (2000) that consider 146
related products for the computation of price are not
applicable in this context. In fact, the application of
our model is similar to Lee et al. (2000), but allows
to introduce more information when the data are
available. The γs are parameters: γ1 is a price para-
meter when the price is not affected by fish size or
offer, γ2 the size-price modifier (it will usually be
positive with larger sizes fetching higher prices) and
γ3 the price-offer modifier (it will usually be nega-
tive, with larger offer resulting in lower prices). If
γ2=0, the price is independent of the weight; if γ3=0
the final price is independent of the offer (i.e. the
market doesn’t influence the price of the product).
These three parameters can be obtained by an empir-
ical regression if data on prices by weight and total
supply (including imports) are available. Given that
prices are not given for age classes in Catalonia and
that we do not consider imports in the present work,
we take γ1 as the average price (constant) and γ2, γ3
equal to 0. 
The fishermen box 
The operation of the fishermen box is represent-
ed in Figure 1, which shows the relationships
between the different variables of this part of the
model. 
The fishermen box converts total revenues to the
fishing effort that will be applied by the gear in the
following unit of time, measured in number of fish-
ing days x hours (Eg), catchability of this fishing
gear (qag), and selectivity factor.
The assumptions basic to the fisherman’s box are 
- The fisherman assumes that the production
depends on the effort and catchability applied.
Catchability is a function of capital and time. 
- The revenues at the end of one period are used
to cover the different costs of the fishing activity for
the next period. Investment is a function of profits. 
- There is a maximum legal limit for number of
days at sea. The number of ships, as well as their
power, is also limited by the administration. 
- The fisherman intends to go fishing for the
maximum number of days that the law and rev-
enues allow. A large body of literature reports that
only effective institutional controls (provided by
the administration or by the fishermen organisa-
tions) can result in a reduction of effective fishing
time. If this control is not effective in Mediter-
ranean conditions (high price, reduced catch,
weak financial capacity and nearness of fishing
grounds) the total fishing time is all the time tech-
nically possible (including summer holidays and
Sundays). 
p w Oa a= γ γ γ1 2 3
RT p C Yg a ag ag
a
m
= +( )
=
∑
1
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For the analysis of costs, we use the methodolo-
gy adopted to produce the Annual Economic Report
of European Union Fisheries (2000), applied to the
specific conditions of the Mediterranean. The
expenses that the fishermen should meet are divided
into 7 groups (Table 2): 
C1 Trade cost. All costs that are possible to
express as a percentage of the Total Revenues for the
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FIG. 1. – Cost structure and decision analysis of the fisherman box
vessel i (RTi). (VAT, Fishermen’s association taxes,
labour taxes, local taxes, sale process, etc.) This is a
percentage of the total of the Total Revenues (RTi):
C1i = c1g · RTi .
We consider c1g to be the same for each group of
vessels (fleet) 
C2 Daily costs. These are the costs caused by
the fishing activity (fuel (CC), net mending, daily
food expenses, etc.), excluding labour cost. They
are a function of fishing effort (the time of fish-
ing: days x hours) and include a part of mainte-
nance costs, such as net mending, which are pro-
portional to effort (C2.1). For each vessel i we
consider
C2i=c2i· Ei .
When the initial RT is reduced by C1 and C2,
what remains is known in Spain as “monte menor”
(MM): 
MM=RT-C1- C2
MM is divided in parts, one for the owner, and
another for the crew (including the owner, when the
owner is a worker). The crew part is a percentage
that can vary among fleets but averages around 50%
(c3g), once the trade costs and the daily costs have
been deducted. 
C3 Labour costs. These are composed of the
share (c3g) corresponding to the crew in function of
MM
C3i = c3g (RTi-C1i-C2i)
It is also possible to obtain the average wage for
each group of vessels as
AWg = C3g /crew number
C4 Compulsory costs (harbour costs, license,
insurance, etc.). Yearly costs incurred by the fisher-
man for keeping his business legal. We suppose that
they are constant. They are not dependent upon
effort. They are considered to be an exogenous vari-
able in the model and are expressed per vessel.
C5 Maintenance costs (flexible costs). These
are the costs required to maintain the fleet at its
maximum performance level. They are included in
the reinstatement of the used capital, repairs, etc.
They are considered as an exogenous variable in the
model and are expressed per vessel. 
C5 is divided in two parts by a percentage per
vessel. The first part is the operating costs that are
indispensable to meet to remain in activity. The sec-
ond part is the other maintenance costs, that is
avoidable (Ca) but lack of maintenance  may reduce
the catchability (painting, maintenance of electronic
devices, maintenance of engine, etc.). This percent-
age (ca) is also considered per vessel.
C6 Opportunity cost. This is the cost of using the
capital invested. It is a function of the capital invested
(I) and the rate of the “Public Debt” (c6). It allows the
determination of what the capital’s alternative prof-
itability would be if it were invested elsewhere for a
fixed term. It indicates the revenues lost (or “opportu-
nities” lost) to the fisherman by investing in the fish-
ing activity. This rate is fixed by country.
C6i=c6c · Ii 
C7 Financial cost. Interest and capital return on
bank loans. In case of negative profits, debts arise
and any further investment necessitates bank loans.
C7 depends on banking interest rates (c7) and the
individual debt (Di) incurred.
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TABLE 2. – Cost analysis by vessel.
Short-term costs Variable costs Trade costs C1 function of catch
Labour costs C3 function of effort
Daily costs C2 function of effort
Fixed costs Maintenance costs C5 function of profits (1)
constant (2)
Compulsory costs C4 constant
Long-term costs Opportunity costs C6 price of money
Financial costs C7 interest rates
1 a part of the maintenance costs is function of benefits. These costs are devoted to improvement of the vessel (increases capital) and are
avoidable
2 a part of the maintenance costs are held constant and represent a minimum unavoidable maintenance of the vessel.
C7i = c7 Di 
Di has an upper limit (maximum debt accepted by
banks) depending on the total capital invested, as the
bank is not willing to lend more than dm · K i, where
dm is a maximal percentage of lend authorised by the
bank, and Ki the total vessel investment.
The fishermen’s decisions
Regarding the fishermen’s “financial health”
after one time-unit period, there exist four possible
results. We model the fishermen’s priorities in
response to these results, so as to meet the expenses
derived from the fishing activity after having met the
unavoidable costs. (If either the fisherman cannot
meet the unavoidable costs or the dismissal price is
higher than the current vessel value, the vessel goes
out of the fishery). 
1st Positive Profits
The profits in the model are totally reinvested.
There exists a technical limitation establishing a
restriction, which determines how much of the
catchability is increased by a new introduction of
investment. This limitation is incorporated in the
catchability modifier. The profits explain a part of
investment (the Internal Investment, Ii), but the total
investment is also affected by subsidies. Then the
total investment (I) is defined as:
I = Ii+ Ie
where Ie are the subsidies that the fishing sector can
receive from institutions (External Investment).
However, the destination of investment is condi-
tioned in the model, just as it is in the Mediterranean
reality, where there is a maximum number of ships
that can be based at a port, a maximum number of
days of fishing, etc. The fisherman can invest to
improve the catchability of the boat and fishing gear
by acquiring fish detection systems, navigation aids,
improving fishing machinery, modernizing the ship,
etc. In our sense, investment is a concept restricted
to the possibility of improving catchability and not
extending to the possibility of increasing effort (as
time at sea and number of vessels) beyond a maxi-
mum level set by the legislation. Investment in the
present period influences catchability across the
fleet in the following period through variation in
total fleet capital. 
The value of the capital of the fleet increases
with the investments. The result of positive prof-
its is, therefore, to increase in the following peri-
od catchability for the gear that has obtained
them, while maintaining fishing effort at its max-
imum levels. 
2nd Negative Profits (losses), but bank credits are
still available
In the case of negative profits, the fisherman shall
try to maintain the same level of activity by borrow-
ing money from the bank. The new loan has to be
added to non-redeemed loans of previous years, if
any. The total debt incurred with the bank is always
limited to a percentage of the value of the capital
(dm), as banks lend money on a personal guarantee.
In the model, this guarantee is the value of the ship,
but the bank (as in any mortgage) does not accept as
guarantee something that has the same value as the
loan. When this limit is exceeded, the possibility of
obtaining new loans disappears, and we must exam-
ine the 3rd possibility, below.
If credit is obtained, the result is that the catcha-
bility and the effort are maintained, but the follow-
ing year a new added cost will exist: the financial
cost (C7), which is unavoidable.
3rd Negative Profits (losses), it is not possible to
borrow more money, but the unavoidable costs can
still be met
If the fisherman cannot cover the costs and can
no longer borrow money to maintain maximum
catchability and fishing effort, he will have to reduce
other costs. 
In this case, the fisherman will reduce all the
costs that are avoidable in the short term: the
avoidable part (Ca) of maintenance costs (C5) in
the first place. This will consequently reduce the
maintenance, and thus the catchability, but still
maintain maximum effort. The maintenance costs
(C5) are necessary to maintain the ship in top
operative condition. If these costs cannot be cov-
ered the value in capital of the fleet decreases and
the catchability falls.
The fisherman will try to fish the legal maximum
of days, but if his losses are larger than the avoidable
maintenance costs he will be forced to reduce other
costs, the only option being to reduce the variable
daily costs (C2). In this way, by consuming less fuel
the fisherman is being forced to reduce fishing effort
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(in fishing days) so as to limit the variable daily
expenses incurred. 
4th Negative Profits (losses) and unavoidable costs
cannot be met
If losses become larger than the avoidable
costs (C2+Ca), the fisherman can no longer make
it in the face of these unavoidable expenses and he
ceases fishing. In this case, not only the catcha-
bility decreases but also the effort, and the ship -
or fleet - disappears from the fishery. The
decrease of fishing mortality will profit the
remaining ships or fleets. 
The time scale
This is a step-by-step model, therefore the time
unit needs to be defined. The complete process takes
place in a unit of time: for example, if the unit of
time is a year, this represents that the fisherman fish-
es, goes to the market, and makes decisions once in
a year, i.e. once in each unit of time. The program
admits the following time scales: week, month,
quarter or year. 
The fish age is measured in the same units as the
time. The time scale has implications for several
aspects of the definition of the work scenario, in par-
ticular for recruitment. The simulation results can be
shown at the time scale at which the simulation has
been carried out, or at a larger scale: for example, it
is possible to carry out the simulation at a weekly
time scale and present the results annually. 
The simulation 
The objective of the model is to carry out projec-
tions starting from the current situation forwards
into the future with the purpose of analyzing the
behaviour of the fishery under different conditions,
particularly different management situations. 
It will then project into the future the fishery over
a certain number of time units. This projection can
be deterministic or stochastic. 
In the deterministic simulation the parameters
have a fixed value set up by the user, and the pro-
jection is carried out using these values. The results
are fixed values.
The stochastic simulation seeks to analyze the
effects of uncertainty of one or several parameters.
Such parameters are provided with a stochastic error
term and the simulation is carried out many times.
The results are probability distributions rather than
fixed numbers. Three types of errors are considered: 
- Uniform additive error. A random uniform dis-
tributed variable is added to the parameter. The user
should set up the variation interval.
- Normal distributed additive error. A random
normal distributed variable is added to the parame-
ter. The mean is 0 and the user should set up the
variance.
- Lognormal multiplicative error. A random log-
normal distributed variable is multiplied by the para-
meter. The mean is 1 and the user should set up the
variance. 
Events 
Along the units of time that are projected, it is
possible to introduce events (generally consisting of
administrative measures) in any time unit. 
Initial conditions
The program start-up requires, besides the para-
meters, the establishment of an initial stock situa-
tion. This implies having the vectors of mortality
and initial number by age class (F and N). In the
case that the user only has the matrix C (by gear and
age), F and N can be reconstructed by means of a
VPA on the pseudocohorts, in this case starting from
the steady state. 
The matrix F and vector N can represent a
steady-state situation or not. The program allows
starting up from both situations, or generating a new
vector N in equilibrium with F and starting up from
that situation. 
Activating and deactivating boxes 
The program allows the activation and deactiva-
tion of the boxes in several ways. This has been pro-
grammed with the purpose of isolating the process-
es to carry out confirmations or analysis. The modal-
ities are three: 
- all the boxes activated. This is the normal oper-
ation of the program; 
- box of the independent stock activated. This
allows simulation of the dynamics of the stock in its
virgin state without the intervention of fishing (can
be useful for checking balance situations or testing
recruitment functions); 
- one or two boxes are blocked so that they give
a constant answer. 
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APPLICATION TO THE HAKE (MERLUCCIUS
MERLUCCIUS) FISHERY OF CATALONIA 
(NW MEDITERRANEAN)
The European hake Merluccius merluccius (L.),
is one of the most commercially important demersal
species in the western Mediterranean (Aldebert and
Carries, 1988; Martín, 1991; Oliver and Massutí,
1995). In the Gulf of Lions, M. merluccius is the
main demersal target species of the Spanish and
French fishing fleets. Annual landings registered are
around 3000 tons, 500 tons corresponding to the
catches of the Spanish fleet (Aldebert and Recasens,
1996). Recruits and juveniles are caught with bot-
tom trawls, and the adults mainly with French gill-
nets and Spanish longlines (Aldebert et al., 1993).
The introduction of longlines in the 1980s (Lleonart,
1990 unpublished report, UE DG XIV, Brussels)
meant a considerable increase in the exploitation of
the adult stock. All assessments of NW Mediter-
ranean hake have shown very clear symptoms of
growth overfishing.
Given the commercial importance of M. merluc-
cius, various studies have compiled biological and
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TABLE 3. – Initial conditions for biological parameters. 
Length-Weight relationship Von Bertalanffy growth equation
a = 0.0069 L inf (cm) = 86.8
b = 3.03 k (years-1) = 0.137
to (years) = -0.367
Maturity scale
age 0 = 0 age 1 = 0 age 2 = 0.08 age 3 = 0.57 age 4 = 0.95 age ≥ 5  = 1
Natural mortality M = 0.2
Recruitment Beverton and Holt function: Asymptote: 10 million individuals; S50%: 218.943 tons
Age years Num. ind. population F (trawl) F (longline) Catch (trawl) (tons) Catch (longline) (tons)
0 6709272 0.487 0 17.26 0
1 3375578 0.739 0 85.14 0
2 1320483 0.459 0.005 72.69 0.02289
3 683166 0.411 0.044 69.41 7.411
4 354925 0.410 0.244 54.79 32.63
5 151118 0.261 0.381 22.05 32.20
6 65132 0.158 0.420 8.040 21.36
7 29900 0.170 0.519 4.822 14.67
8 12291 0.108 0.503 1.588 7.368
9 5463 0.013 0.504 0.1047 4.024
10 2668 0.043 0.458 0.1953 2.059
11 1323 0 0.544 0 1.330
12 629 0 0.395 0 0.5399
13 347 0 0.204 0 0.1820
14 232 0 0.491 0 0.2749
15 116 0 0.433 0 0.1323
16 62 0 0.120 0 0
17 51 0 0.276 0 0.04327
18 31 0 0.425 0 0.04007
19 17 0 0.270 0 0.01510
Total biomass = 808.864 tons; SSB = 499.504 tons
TABLE 4. – Initial conditions for economic parameters. The simula-
tions have been carried out taking into account the individual ves-
sels; in this table only the averages of the individual vessels are 
presented.
Cost structure of the fleets Trawlers Longliners
Capital in € / vessel 476996 179042
Annual insurance in € / vessel 5227 4218
Annual costs in € / vessel 15377 12180
Commercial costs in % 19 19
Owner’s share in % 50 50
Daily ice expenses in € / day 9 7
Technical structure of the fleets
GRT / vessel 72 11
HP / vessel 460 117
Crew / vessel 5 3
Daily fuel consumption in liters / vessel 1052 331
Daily fishing hours 12.8 12.0
Annual fishing days 200 180
Number of vessels 16 14
Market 
Hake price in € / kg 6 9
Other species 3 15
Other economic factors
Opportunity cost in % 2
Financial cost in % 5
Fuel price in € / liter 0.27 
fishing data from the area under study (Oliver and
Massutí, 1995; Recasens et al. 1998; Morales et al.
1998). Therefore, this is a good example for showing
gear interaction and its implications for a stock and
the fishermen’s economy. In the present application
(MEFISTO) we have considered the Spanish fishery,
located in the western part of the Gulf of Lions. This
fleet is made up of 17 bottom trawlers and 14 long-
liners. Total Gross Tonnage (GT) is around 1600 for
bottom trawl fleet and 210 for longline fleet.
European hake stock parameters were obtained
from Aldebert et al. (1993), Aldebert and Recasens
(1996). From steady state initial conditions (Table 3,
biological parameters and Table 4, economic para-
meters), several alternative management measures
were tested through MEFISTO software. Manage-
ment measures, consisting of various types of reduc-
tion of fishing effort, were selected in order to
counter growth overfishing. Simulations were pro-
jected on a 25-year scenario. Three scenarios are
presented, defined by different events always intro-
duced in year 5 of the simulation. 
Scenario 1: A decrease of bottom trawl fishing
time, from 12.8 hours/day to 9 hours/day 
Scenario 2: Trawl fleet reduction by deactivating
the 3 largest trawlers.
Scenario 3: Longline fleet reduction by deacti-
vating the 3 largest longliners.
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FIG. 2. – European hake stock and fishery in the initial situation. 25-year design.
RESULTS
Figure 2 shows the initial conditions and a 25
years projection with no management measures.
Stock and catches maintain a constant value until
year 8. An increase in the stock values, catches and
profits is observed from year 8 until year 25 due to
decrease of the number of active boats (17 to 8
trawlers, 14 to 12 longliners). This initial situation
implies that the present condition is not sustainable
for fishermen without the current subsidising of the
fleet, so some boats would disappear in the absence
of management measures. 
Figure 3 shows the effect of reduction of fishing
hours per day of the trawl fleet from year 5 (scenario
1). In this case the stock shows an immediate
increase. Catches for the longline show the same
response and catches for the bottom trawl show a
decrease between year 5 and 6, and then an increase
until reaching a level of catches higher than the initial.
There is also a reduction of the trawl fleet, from the
initial 17 vessels to 6 vessels. Longliners take strong
advantage, while trawlers reach positive profits and
increase catches at the end of the period simulated.
Figure 4 shows the effect of fleet reduction (sce-
narios 2 and 3). If the reduction is on the trawl fleet,
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FIG. 3. – European hake stock and fishery with the event 1: reduction of fishing hours per day of the bottom trawl fleet from year 5: 12.8 h → 9 h.
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FIG. 4. – European hake stock and fishery with the events 2 and 3; a, event 2: reduction of the trawl fleet: deactivation of the 3 biggest trawlers; 
b, event 3: reduction of the longline fleet: deactivation of the 3 biggest longliners.
by way of deactivating the 3 largest trawlers (Fig.
4a), the stock biomass reaches a high level, while
bottom trawl catches are reduced initially and then
reach a higher level from year 14. Longline catches
are higher and exceed the trawl catches from year
13. Results in terms of profits are clearly positive for
longliners and with a slight positive trend for
trawlers. On the other hand, if the reduction is on the
longline fleet, by deactivating the 3 largest longlin-
ers (Fig. 4b), results for the stock are similar to fig-
ure 4a but reaching a lower level, catches show a
slight increase for trawlers and for the profits, the
slight positive trend is maintained.
DISCUSSION
The situation of growth overexploitation of the
hake fishery in the Gulf of Lions has been stated in
some papers (Aldebert et al., 1993; Aldebert and
Recasens, 1996). This means that the effort is
excessive or the size of the individuals caught is
too low, or both. This problem is mainly generated
by trawl, because the trawling fleet is larger than
the longliner and the target is the smaller individu-
als of the stock.
The management measures tested in this paper
show that due to the higher importance of the trawl
compared to the longline, the most positive effect on
the stock is obtained when reducing trawling. There-
fore, in the Mediterranean fisheries, the controlled
introduction of a fishing gear directed at the adult
stock does not per se have an overly negative effect.
However, the stock is more sensitive to changes that
affect the juveniles. Regarding the different fleets, it
has been found that trawlers do not have overall pos-
itive profits at the present status, and the current
trend would be to decrease the trawler fleet, in the
absence of subsidies. If the current structure of the
fleets is maintained it would be better to reduce
longlining, being the only case when the trawler
fleet is maintained.
If the managers’ objective was stock recovery,
removal of trawlers or trawling effort would be the
appropriate management measure. Nevertheless, if
the managers’ objective was to maintain the labour
force (not tested here) a more appropriate measure
would be to remove longlining, because it employs
less people. This clearly illustrates the management
conflicts between diverse objectives. 
The increase in profitability in the mid-term,
which arises from the management measures tested
here, may in the long run cause conflicts between
the fleets, as new entrants to the fishery may be
encouraged, because of dormant effort.
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